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"TAKE THIS JOB AND SHOVE IT": THE RISE 
OF FREE LABOR 
Jonathan A. Bush* 
THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN 
ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870. By 
Robert J. Steinfeld. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
1991. Pp. viii, 277. $39.95. 
Sooner or later in their first-year curriculum, most law students 
learn of the contracts doctrine that denies plaintiffs the remedy of spe-
cific performance for breaches of personal services and labor con-
tracts.1 Courts deny specific performance for a number of sensible 
reasons. The party in breach would be unlikely to perform the prom-
ise enthusiastically, and supervision by the promisee would create an 
awkward situation. But the courts occasionally mention another, 
more archaic reason for denying specific performance: forcing a de-
faulting employee to complete the contract would be akin to placing 
him into involuntary servitude, even slavery.2 
Simply put, Robert Steinfeld's The Invention of Free Labor 3 uses 
• Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School, Yeshiva University. A.B. 
1975, Princeton; B.Litt. 1977, Trinity College Oxford University; J.D. 1980, Yale. - Ed. The 
title is borrowed from the song of the same name, "Take this Job and Shove It." Johnny 
Paycheck, Take This Job and Shove It, on TAKE THIS JOB AND SHOVE IT (CBS Records 1977). 
As usual, I thank Guyora Binder, Peter Coffman, Laird Hart, Lisa Lang, and Ruth Robbins. J. 
H. Baker and Robert C. Stacey graciously shared unpublished manuscripts with me. Professor 
Stacey, John S. Beckerman, and Paul Finkelman gave me the benefit of their critical comments. 
Elena Goyanes and Charles Szurgot provided valuable research assistance. I thank them all. I 
also thank the editors of the Michigan Law Review for invaluable editorial assistance. Special 
thanks are due to David Bleich, David Carlson, Drucilla Cornell, Edward de Grazia, Eva Hanks, 
Jonathan Silver, and Richard Weisberg. The review is dedicated to Isabel Anna Bush, whose 
mother labored on her behalf. 
1. See, e.g., De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige Ch. 264, 270 (N.Y. Ch. 1833); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 (1981); WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
CONTRACT § 409, at 520-22 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 5th ed. 1930). 
2. See, e.g., Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 318 (7th Cir. 1894); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 367 cmt. a (1981); OLIVER w. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 235 (Mark D. 
Howe ed., 1963) (1881). Holmes rejects 
the superfluous theory that contract is a qualified subjection of one will to another, a kind of 
limited slavery. It might be so regarded if the law compelled men to perform their con-
tracts, or if it allowed promisees to exercise such compulsion. If, when a man promised to 
labor for another, the law made him do it, his relation to his promisee might be called a 
servitude ad hoc with some truth. But that is what the law never does. 
Id. For a modem critique of the indentured servitude rationale in the context of bankruptcy and 
family law, see Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383, 
431-32, 444-54 (1993). 
3. Robert J. Steinfeld is a Professor of Law at the State University of New York at Buffalo 
School of Law. 
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this doctrinal backwater in contract law to reinterpret the history of 
Anglo-American labor law. On one level, Steinfeld offers an extended 
exploration of the recent development and mendacity of the no-spe-
cific-performance rule. The Case of Mary Clark, in which the Indiana 
Supreme Court declined to permit specific performance to enforce in-
dentured servitude, is conventionally seen as a contract case, articulat-
ing the familiar common law rule against coercive performance.4 Far 
from being a mere building block in the Langdellian world of con-
tracts, the rule against coercive performance enunciated in Mary Clark 
and elsewhere was a fundamental element of the emerging nineteenth-
century notion of "free labor." Equally important, the rule was a radi-
cal departure from long-standing common law doctrines of how em-
ployees ought to be governed. Mary Clark represented a critical 
turning point in labor law and in the social understanding of what it 
means to be a free worker and citizen. 
Drawing upon legal material like the case of Mary Clark, Professor 
Steinfeld's book offers a complete reinterpretation of the evolution of 
labor law. It is a broad story, with its roots in medieval serfdom and 
its culmination in the "free labor" ideology of the nineteenth century. 
The argument is daring, for Steinfeld claims that the received under-
standing of labor law history is right about its starting point (medieval 
serfdom) and its conclusion (free labor), but little else. In particular, 
the traditional account completely misses both the importance of coer-
cion in regulating labor and the absence, until relatively recently, of a 
modem understanding of free labor and persons. 
Steinfeld traces the tenacity of coerced labor, including specialized 
relationships like indentured servitude and apprenticeship, and also 
the modem-style wage relationships of "servants in husbandry" (agri-
cultural laborers) and craftsmen. Before the nineteenth century, a dis-
satisfied employee in any of these working relationships was not free to 
leave. Both English and colonial American law required employees to 
complete their contractual terms of service or the tasks for which they 
had been retained on pain of specific performance and criminal sanc-
tions (pp. 8, 13, 40-52). In many instances, the law also required per-
sons not already employed to find a "master" and enter into a long-
term contract (pp. 22-23, 33). Steinfeld's analysis is original in that he 
takes the next step, combining this description of the forms of com-
pelled labor with the seemingly unrelated fact that common law had 
long concluded that practically all Englishmen were personally free. 
The result is a new, complex picture of early modem freedom, illus-
trating the perfect consistency of legally free status, of which contem-
poraries were so proud, with a regime of harsh compelled labor. 
Steinfeld also explores the legal collapse of these various forms of 
4. Pp. 143-49, 156, 175 (discussing The Case of Mary Clark, a Woman of Color, l Blackf. 
122 (Ind. 1821)). 
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coerced labor and their replacement with modem notions of "free la-
bor" in the early nineteenth century. Henceforth, there would not be 
degrees of practical "unfreedom"; both labor and personal status were 
exclusively free or slave. Compulsion persisted longest in the institu-
tions of indentured service and apprenticeship, chiefly on the rationale 
that, however coercive those institutions were, they were voluntary. 
Unfree labor was thereby consistent with contractarian individualism 
(pp. 90-91, 105-11). But if ideological accommodation permitted co-
erced labor to persist into the era of capitalism, it was also ideology 
rather than economics that led to its final rejection. Steinfeld argues 
that, in the early nineteenth century, the increasing opposition of 
working people to coerced labor forced common law judges to view 
even voluntary coerced labor as little different from slavery, and hence 
as illegitimate (pp. 94, 123-27, 159, 163). 
To make this ambitious set of claims, Steinfeld relies on an impres-
sive command of sprawling bodies of legal and historical scholarship 
- English and colonial and antebellum American. The result is an 
account that on the whole is compelling. Regardless of its ultimate 
success, the Steinfeld account is the most ambitious attempt in many 
decades to grapple with the intellectual history of Anglo-American la-
bor law. In an age of scholarly monographs, Steinfeld has undertaken 
a task of almost heroic sweep. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT OF LABOR LAW 
AND ITS PROBLEMS 
What is the matter with the traditional account of labor law? It 
offers a smooth explanation of the legal shifts from thirteenth-century 
serfdom to nineteenth-century wage labor, largely by identifying legal 
change as a corollary to social, economic, and demographic trends. 
According to this account, laborers were largely unfree and immobile 
in the medieval period, but they secured legal freedom in the favorable 
economic climate of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. After 
that time, most Englishmen worked for wages, and what quaintly be-
came known as the law of "master and servant" was, for all but resi-
dent household servants and apprentices, the law of employer-
employee. At the heart of this traditional account is the early date at 
which laboring men and women became legally free. 
Before considering the difficulties - for both Steinfeld and this 
reviewer - with the traditional account, it is necessary to sketch out 
its major arguments more fully. In the High Middle Ages, English 
society was overwhelmingly agrarian, and labor was unfree. This 
characterization is axiomatic for serfs or "villeins," since the essence 
of their legal status lay in their being bound to the soil and obliged to 
provide their manorial lords with labor services. But even persons of 
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legally free status might owe labor services in exchange for their land. 5 
While these free persons formally could withdraw their labor, as a 
practical matter few wanted to abandon their land.6 Moreover, the 
separation of personal status and land tenure under early common law 
meant that personally free peasants could hold land by unfree tenure 
involving labor services. As a result, many medieval persons, whether 
legally free or not, lived under a regime of coerced labor. 
All this began to change by the fourteenth century. A century of 
prosperity had brought rural England close to the Malthusian trap: 
too many mouths, overintensive cultivation, and declining crop 
yields. 7 Many lords commuted labor obligations, replacing serf labor 
with cheaper hired labor, 8 and elsewhere serfs fled in search of oppor-
tunity. The decline of manorial serfdom was accelerated by the Black 
Death, which carried off approximately one third of the population.9 
With labor suddenly scarce, both serfs and free peasants managed to 
cut better deals for themselves. In what was tantamount to a lengthy 
nationwide process of renegotiation and redistribution, peasants took 
on larger landholdings of better land and on more favorable terms, 
owing money rents rather than labor in kind - all backed by the new 
power of their actual or implicit threats to withdraw labor and move 
to a new lord. For some 150 years, the relative scarcity of labor gave 
the upper hand to smallholders and laborers.10 Significantly, the peas-
5. See, e.g., H. s. BENNETT, LIFE ON THE ENGLISH MANOR: A STUDY OF PEASANT CON-
DITIONS 1150-1400, at 103 (1937) (terming labor services by free tenants "exceptional"); ED-
WARD MILLER, THE ABBEY AND BISHOPRIC OF ELY 128-29, 141 (1951) (documenting free men 
owing similar services to those of unfree men, including labor); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FRE-
DERIC \V. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 370-
71 (2d ed. 1968) (stressing uncertainty of labor, rather than labor services, as a test of villein 
tenure); CUSTUMALS OF THE MANORS OF LAUGHTON, WILLINGDON AND GORING xxx, 3-8 
(Arthur E. Wilson ed., 60 Sussex Record Socy. 1961). 
6. John Hatcher, English Serfdom and Villeinage: Towards a Reassessment, PAST & PRES-
ENT, Feb. 1981, at 3, 16-24. 
7. See H.E. HALLAM, RURAL ENGLAND 1066-1348, at 245-64 (1981); Edward Miller, The 
English Economy in the Thirteenth Century: Implications of Recent Research, PAST & PRESENT, 
July 1964, at 21, 33-36. 
8. The modern debate on commutation was begun by Professor Michael Postan. MICHAEL 
M. POSTAN, The Chronology of Labour Services, 20 TRANS. ROY. HIST. Soc. 169 (4th ser. 1937), 
reprinted in EssAYS ON MEDIEVAL AGRICULTURE AND GENERAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEDIE-
VAL ECONOMY 89 (1973) [hereinafter POSTAN, Chronology]. See Evsey D. Domar, The Causes 
of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis, 30 J. EcoN. HIST. 18, 29 (1970), reprinted in EvsEY D. 
DOMAR, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & SERFDOM 225, 235-36 (1989) (surveying thirteenth-century 
commutation and suggesting an economic model). 
9. See, e.g., PHILIP ZIEGLER, THE BLACK DEATH 238 (1969). 
10. EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY 
OF ENGLAND 108-09 (rev. ed. 1929); CHRISTOPHER DYER, STANDARDS OF LIVING IN THE 
LATER MIDDLE AGES: SOCIAL CHANGE IN ENGLAND C. 1200-1520, at 216-17 (1989); PAUL 
D.A. HARVEY, A MEDIEVAL OXFORDSHIRE VILLAGE: CUXHAM, 1240 TO 1400, at 139 (1965); 
Michael M. Postan, The Fifteenth Century, 9 ECON. HIST. REV. 160, 166 (1939). Of course the 
picture is more complex than this sketch permits. See, e.g., J.L. BOLTON, MEDIEVAL ENGLISH 
EcONOMY, 1150-1500, at 211-14 (1980) (demesne farmers prosper until 1370s); DYER, supra, at 
231 (masters probably forced their increasingly costly labor force to work harder); HARVEY, 
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antry of England was able to win not only better economic terms, but 
also de facto or even legal freedom. · 
This wresting of legal freedom was not achieved without struggle. 
There had long been manorial and burghal rules forbidding free move-
ment of labor and mandating customary wages (p. 28), and the Ordi-
nance of Laborers (1349) and the Statute of Laborers (1351) adapted 
these rules for national application (pp. 22-23, 28-30). Through these 
acts, manorial lords and a national government responsive to their in-
terests tried to restrain the mobility of labor and the level of wages. 
But legislation could not successfully restrain wages and labor mobil-
ity in the face of landowners who were interested in controlling their 
own workers and luring their neighbors' workers, and laborers who 
knew how to flee, purchase exemptions, resist forcibly, and use the 
litigation process. I I Legislation also could not stand in the way of 
strong demographic and economic trends. I2 Since unfree peasants and 
laborers consistently sought free status, the decline of serfdom was in-
evitable. I3 By the late fourteenth century, serfdom was clearly on the 
wane, and by the mid-sixteenth century it was all but gone. 
The decline of English serfdom did not mean that peasants and 
laborers continued to enjoy rising standards of living. On the con-
trary, living standards tended to fall from the early sixteenth century, 
dispossession of the peasantry accelerated, and the ranks of the land-
less and the poor swelled. I4 The traditional account of labor law was 
based in part on these findings. Indeed, the early twentieth-century 
supra, at 139-40 (small farmers were thrown back on family labor only, since hired labor was 
now too expensive); RODNEY H. HILTON, THE DECLINE OF SERFDOM IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 
38-43 (2d ed. 1969) (lords attempted to reimpose feudal obligations and occasionally succeeded). 
11. For the various forms of peasant resistance, see HILTON, supra note 10, at 35-43; ROD• 
NEY H. HILTON, THE ENGLISH PEASANTRY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 64-73 (1975); 
GEORGE C. HOMANS, ENGLISH VILLAGERS OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 276-81 (1941); 
Rodney H. Hilton, Peasant Movements in England Before 1381, 2 ECON. HIST. REV. 2 (2d ser. 
1949), reprinted in 2 EssAYS IN EcONOMIC HISTORY 73 (E.M. Cams-Wilson ed., 1962) and in 
RODNEY H. HILTON, CLASS CONFLICT AND THE CRISIS OF FEUDALISM 122 (1985). But see 
MICHAEL M. POSTAN, Legal Status and Economic Conditions in Medieval Villages, in EssAYS 
ON MEDIEVAL AGRICULTURE AND GENERAL PROBLEMS OF THE MEDIEVAL ECONOMY, supra 
note 8, at 278, 283-84 (few peasants bothered to purchase formal manumission) [hereinafter Pos-
TAN, Legal Status]; J.Z. Trrow, ENGLISH RURAL SOCIETY 1200-1350, at 58-59 (1969) (ques· 
tioning whether various instances of peasant resistance were not exceptional). 
12. See, e.g., DYER, supra note 10, at 218-19 (legal regulation widely thought ineffective, 
though statutes possibly succeeded in deterring some labor mobility and wage demands); Demar, 
supra note 8, at 29 (legislation ineffective against economic forces). Indeed, modem free market 
disciples have often cited the late medieval statutes for the general proposition that wage-price 
controls never work to restrain market forces in the long run. 
13. Trrow, supra note 11, at 58. But see I.S. Leadam, The Last Days of Bondage in England, 
9 L.Q. REV. 348 (1893) (arguing that villeinage persisted until the late sixteenth century). 
14. See, e.g., A.L. BEIER, MASTERLESS MEN: THE VAGRANCY PROBLEM IN ENGLAND, 
1560-1640, at 18-24 (1985); HILTON, supra note 10, at 57; W.G. HOSKINS, THE AGE OF PLUN-
DER: KING HENRY'S ENGLAND, 1500-1547, at 60-72 (1976); JOHN POUND, POVERTY AND 
VAGRANCY IN TUDOR ENGLAND 3-25 (1971); PAUL SLACK, THE ENGLISH POOR LAW 1531-
1782, at 11 (1990). 
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landmark histories of labor and poverty were typically written by re-
formers and social activists. 15 The reformers knew of the massive ru-
ral dispossession of the peasantry beginning in the sixteenth century -
of which Sir Thomas More famously warned16 - and of the dangers 
of an increasing population and price inflation in a subsistence econ-
omy. The reformers also knew of the contemporary perception that 
poverty and vagrancy were on the rise and that the highways, forests, 
and cities swarmed with "masterless men." 
The traditional account of labor law provides, however, that Eng-
lish labor enjoyed legally free status from an early date, approximately 
the late Middle Ages. 17 When common law's only unfree status -
villeinage - fell into desuetude in the century after the Black Death, 
all persons necessarily were free. 18 The enforcement of the late medie-
val labor statutes represented the attempt to extract labor from free 
men, and the governance of labor was a separate question from that of 
personal status. As for early modem labor statuses and institutions 
that bore the hallmarks of unfreedom - such as apprenticeship, servi-
tude by annual retainer or indenture, impressment into military ser-
vice, and bridewell work pursuant to the poor relief acts19 - the 
traditional account holds that they did not imply unfree personal sta-
tus. Only villeinage could constitute common law servitude, and, as 
Sir Thomas Smith wrote in the 1560s, "[n]either of the one sort [vil-
leins in gross] nor of the other [villeins regardant] have we any number 
in England. And of the first I never knewe any in the realme in my 
time: of the seconde so fewe there be, that it is not almost worth the 
speaking."20 In much the way that modem lawyers reconcile coercive 
institutions like prison labor and conscripted military service with the 
Thirteenth Amendment, traditional historians of labor law insist that 
the early modem institutions were temporary, voluntary, regulated by 
paternalistic oversight, or otherwise distinguishable from legal servi-
tude. England had "too pure an air for slaves to dwell in,"21 meaning 
15. See the works cited infra note 89. 
16. THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 32-33 (Mildred Campbell ed., Walter J. Black, Inc. 1947) 
(1516). 
17. See, e.g., RICHARD H. TAWNEY, THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE SIXTEENTH CEN-
TURY 43 (1912). 
18. A famous assertion of this is found in antislavery cases like Somerset. There it was ar-
gued that English law knew only villeinage unfreedom, a slave was not a villein, therefore Eng-
lish law did not recognize slavery. Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft I, 3; 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 500 (K.B. 
1772). 
19. See, e.g., THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 137-38 (L. Alston ed., Cam-
bridge University Press 1906) (1583) ("An other kinde of servitude or bondage is used in En-
glande for the necessitie thereof, which is called apprenticehoode. But this is onely by covenaunt, 
and for a time, and during the time it is vera servitus . . . . Besides apprentises, others be ... 
called servaunts ... which be not in such bondage as apprentises .... "). 
20. Id. at 130-31. 
21. Pp. 96, 225 n.10. For similar legal talk in France, see ROBIN BLACKBURN, THE OVER-
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that English labor, however oppressed in fact or in law, was funda-
mentally free labor, subject to regulation only at the margins. 
Steinfeld bridles against this traditional account, and there is much 
to support his discomfiture. The peasants and laborers of medieval 
England were not uniformly unfree. Many, perhaps most, manors re-
lied on hired work, often performed by landless men, in addition to the 
labor of serfs holding land by precarious customary terms.22 These 
hired workers and their payments, in wages or grain ("liveries"), may 
seem like a distortion of classic feudal theory, but they were structural 
features of English manorialism, The picture of a largely unfree peas-
antry exchanging its labor for land is simply incomplete. Indeed, in 
the twelfth century, wage labor became a dominant form of labor, as 
lords and long-term lessees of manors ("farmers") commuted the la-
bor obligations of peasants and replaced the serfs with hired labor-
ers. 23 Twelfth-century lords were capable of behaving like profit-
maximizing employers of free labor, rather than like feudal lords sad-
dled with customary labor.24 
Significantly, these hired laborers tended to be free, de facto and 
sometimes de jure.25 Perhaps their freedom meant little more than 
that they were free to move when pushed and free to accept the least 
unattractive employment offer; if so, medieval hired laborers were free 
in a way that their nineteenth-century descendants might have found 
familiar. But the traditional account of labor also distorts medieval 
freedom more generally by presenting almost all labor as coerced, de-
pendent, and ipso facto unfree. Long before the Black Death, money 
payments replaced labor service on many manors, such that even vil-
leins often did not render labor under coercion; instead, their "labor 
service" was a measure of additional rent and a badge of their formal 
status. When lords sought to extract customary labor or pay below 
market wages, peasants often resisted, challenging both the obligation 
to work and its implication of unfree status. 26 In fact, we have only 
recently realized the profound complexity of legal status and personal 
THROW OF COLONIAL SLAVERY 1776-1848, at 41 (1988); DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF 
SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 46 (1966). 
22. MICHAEL M. POSTAN, THE FAMULUS: THE ESTATE LABOURER IN THE TWELFTH 
AND THE THIRTEENTH CENTURIES 30-31 (1954); MICHAEL M. POSTAN, THE MEDIEVAL 
EcONOMY AND SOCIETY 148-49, 224-25 (1972); see also ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF 
ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM 148-50 (1978) (stressing importance of landless wage laborers and ser-
vants, as part of a larger argument that medieval England did not have a "peasantry"). 
23. POSTAN, Chronology, supra note 8, at 93-100. 
24. But see Edward Miller, England in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries: An Economic 
Contrast?, 24 EcoN. HIST. REV. l, 7-8 (2d ser. 1971) (arguing that lords often made the "wrong" 
- that is, unprofitable - decision in continuing to farm out their lands and in not retaining 
labor services for demesne farming, and that they did so for traditionalist reasons). 
25. But see DYER, supra note 10, at 217-18 (landless serfs working for wages were not mean-
ingfully free); MILLER, supra note 5, at 142 (landless serfs working elsewhere as servants still had 
residual value to their lords). 
26. RODNEY H. HILTON, BOND MEN MADE FREE 154-56 (1973). 
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and tenurial freedom that existed from the late eleventh to mid-thir-
teenth centuries.27 Certainly common law villeinage, as it was devised 
in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, was not simply a restate-
ment of traditional unfree status. Rather, villeinage was a particular 
configuration of legal disabilities and tests, cast in new binary (free-
unfree) form and imposed on at least some persons who had always 
considered themselves free or free enough. 
Nor does the traditional narrative satisfactorily explain sixteenth-
and seventeenth-century "free labor." The traditional account insists 
that labor institutions such as indentured servitude, apprenticeship, 
and military impressment operated on free persons and were consis-
tent with their personal freedom. But these were coercive and fre-
quently brutal practices, and in more candid moments contemporaries 
recognized that they differed little from slavery or serfdom (p. 101). 
Given the prevalence of these practices, there is little to gain from 
denying that the common law sanctioned certain forms of servile la-
bor, and much to commend in characterizing early modern labor as 
significantly unfree. 
If anything, coercive labor practices seemed to expand in the early 
modern period. It is very well to point, as generations of common 
lawyers have, to the short life of the notorious Vagrancy Act of 
1547,28 the only statute that expressly created a slave status for En-
glishmen. The act was repealed almost immediately after its enact-
ment, and most commentators took its repeal to support the 
proposition that English law would tolerate no status but freedom. 
But the arrangements routinely made under the Old Poor Law for 
paupers, including forcible work in bridewells29 and the placement of 
pauper children as "parish apprentices" (p. 120) in dangerous occupa-
tions, were harshly coercive.30 Moreover, late Tudor evidence shows 
that men were consigned to the galleys as slaves and that, at least for 
27. See infra text accompanying notes 92-109. 
28. 1 Edw. VI., c. 3 (1547), repealed by 3 & 4 Edw. VI, c. 16 (citing the "extremitie of some 
[of such laws] have byn occation that they have not ben putt in [use]"). As Blackstone put it, 
"the spirit of the nation could not brook this [a slave's] condition, even in the most abandoned 
rogues .... " 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *412. 
For a general discussion of the act, see C.S.L. Davies, Slavery and Protector Somerset: The Va-
grancy Act of 1547, 19 EcoN. HIST. REV. 533 (2d ser. 1966). 
29. 1 COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX: CALENDAR TO THE SESSIONS RECORDS: NEW SERIES, 
1612-1614, at x, 400 (William Le Hardy ed., 1935) ("Two men in 1614 were sent to Bridewell to 
be whipped, shaved, and kept at perpetual labour") (second emphasis added). The possibility of 
perpetual coerced free labor is explored in Otto Kahn-Freund, Blackstone's Neglected Child: The 
Contract of Employment, 93 L. Q. REv. 508, 516-18 (1977) (discussing Blackstone and 
Bentham). 
30. See, e.g., JOHN c. COBDEN, THE WHITE SLAVES OF ENGLAND 117-18, 203 (Irish Univ. 
Press 1971) (2d ed. 1860); M. DOROTHY GEORGE, LONDON LIFE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CEN-
TURY 224-31 (1965); JOHN L. HAMMOND & BARBARA HAMMOND, THE TOWN LABORER 1760-
1832, at 155-67 (1977); JOHN RULE, THE EXPERIENCE OF LABOUR IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLISH INDUSTRY 102 (1981); SLACK, supra note 14, at 39-40. 
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those individuals, the law did not flinch from explicit slave status.31 
The rapid growth of indentured servitude and Indian and black 
slavery in the colonies is, of course, even more damaging to the re-
ceived picture of free labor. Colonial indentured servitude relied on 
certain formal doctrines from the English law of apprenticeship and 
servitude, but it was a radically different, and consistently more brutal, 
institution as practiced in the New World. Indeed, plantation slavery 
was wholly new to the common law. Granted, it is possible to differ-
entiate metropolitan free labor from these colonial practices and to 
argue that colonial labor innovations did not affect the general propo-
sition that at home all men and labor were free. The common law 
relied on this metropolitan-colonial distinction, and the courts of a 
number of Continental powers did so as well. 32 But this distinction 
was far from convincing, and servitude and slavery in the colonies co-
existed uneasily with the notion that common law recognized only free 
labor and free status with the exception of "villeinage." As a result, 
the traditional proposition that all labor was free by the sixteenth cen-
tury represents a circular legal description and an inadequate social 
description. 
II. STEINFELD'$ REINTERPRETATION OF FREE 
AND COERCED LABOR 
Steinfeld responds to the traditional picture of free labor by 
presenting a radically different model, consisting of three related argu-
ments. First, most labor was governed by coercion - the legal obliga-
tion to work and finish one's work on pain of specific performance, 
imprisonment, or other forms of legal compulsion. In that sense, labor 
was unfree in practice until at least the eighteenth century, in both 
England and its American colonies (chs. 2-4). Second, nobody con-
flated the coercion of labor with the slave status of plantation blacks 
because the common law assumed that all (whites) were free and be-
cause the modem free-unfree dichotomy is itself an anachronism that 
has little applicability until the late eighteenth century (pp. 10, 13, 53-
54, 99-104). Third, the replacement of the unfree labor paradigm with 
the new "free labor" model was not an inevitable byproduct of eight-
eenth- or nineteenth-century capitalism, but rather resulted from ideo-
logical struggles in which republicanism, the American Revolution, 
and the persistence of the increasingly odious institution of black slav-
ery (pp. 137-46) impelled average American working men and women 
to act (pp. 123-27, 181). 
Behind this ambitious argument is Steinfeld's premise that early 
31. See A.F. POLLARD, ENGLAND UNDER PROTECTOR SOMERSET 224 n.1 (1966); Davies, 
supra note 28, at 548 n.3; J. H. Baker, The Roots of Modern Freedom: Personal Liberty Under 
the Common Law, 1200-1600, at 20-21 (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
32. BLACKBURN, supra note 21, at 42. 
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modem "freedom" is best understood as the interaction of labor regu-
lations and social institutions, and not as the formal ascription of com-
mon law "free" status. Traditional legal historians would find this 
first step to be strained and doctrinally wrong, since by its own terms 
the common law defined free status not in terms of legal disabilities on 
labor, but rather as the opposite of villeinage. Steinfeld's aim, how-
ever, is not to account for doctrine in its traditional common law pige-
onholes, but to use doctrine to explain larger legal and social 
structures. Having decoupled his inquiry from reliance on the law of 
villeinage or the practices of manorial serfdom, Steinfeld proceeds to 
assemble his case for the unfreedom of labor prior to the nineteenth 
century. He emphasizes a careful parsing of the two principal regula-
tory statutes, the Statute of Laborers (1351) and the Statute of Artifi-
cers (1563), and an analysis of their enforcement (pp. 22-23, 28-30, 77-
78). 
Through this point in his argument, Steinfeld's presentation is 
original in two senses. First, his claim that the regulatory scheme was 
not merely oppressive, but also defined a regime of coerced labor, goes 
considerably further than the claims of previous progressive histori-
ans. 33 Second, he makes this argument by emphasizing certain little-
remembered but critical provisions of the two major labor statutes. 
Earlier studies of labor regulation have consistently focused on other 
provisions of these statutes, chiefly those addressing wage-fixing and 
mandatory apprenticeship, 34 perhaps because enforcement of these 
provisions seemed most amenable to quantitative testing. In contrast, 
Steinfeld stresses the general statutory requirements that various 
classes of persons seek work and that anyone obligated to work com-
plete his term or task on pain of imprisonment or forcible specific per-
formance (pp. 22-24, 30-31, 36-37). He thereby succeeds in using 
familiar evidence in a novel way, anchoring the statutes in the context 
of unfreedom. 
Steinfeld's general claim that labor and persons were meaningfully 
"unfree" in terms of being subject to coercion (p. 102) is both original 
and correct, but some of Steinfeld's legal arguments rely on evidence 
that is more ambivalent in practice than he allows. Consider the Stat-
ute of Artificers (1563), a central element in his treatment of labor law 
(pp. 23-24, 31-33, 38-40). Steinfeld should not be faulted for assem-
bling a relatively small body of case law to support his contention that, 
under the Statute's sections 2-6, local officials were able to force per-
sons to enter or complete terms of service. As he notes, the incom-
plete state of local recordkeeping prior to the seventeenth century 
33. See, e.g., MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LAW: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 51-55 (1989). 
34. See, e.g., WAGE REGULATION IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND (W.E. Minchinton ed., 
1972) (including works by R.H. Tawney and R. Keith Kelsall, and citing other literature). 
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partly explains the dearth of record entries, as does the fact that cer-
tain enforcement steps could be taken by one or two justices acting 
informally.35 
But the Statute of Artificers' ideological support for a regime of 
unfree labor is undermined by evidence that some masters denounced 
the act and that other provisions of the statute were at times popular 
with working people. Legislators and magistrates often opposed the 
statute's apprenticeship provision as a cause of unemployment and 
economic stagnation,36 thus anticipating Adam Smith's later views.37 
Conversely, for at least some struggling journeymen, the statutory re-
quirement that persons serve apprenticeships before entering certain 
trades was protective rather than burdensome, since it prevented a 
flood of newly admitted competitors leading to the impoverishment of 
all.38 Similarly, the wage-fixing provisions of the Statute have been 
widely denounced by later scholars, both Left and Right. 39 Contem-
poraries, however, saw wage fixing differently. On some occasions pa-
ternalist Tudor-Stuart governments pressed local magistrates to raise 
wages.40 Well into the eighteenth century many working people 
viewed statutory assessments not as coercive but benevolent, and they 
sought new assessments to raise wages.41 
35. Pp. 29-30, 229 n.63; see also ROBERT B. SHOEMAKER, PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT: 
PETIT CRIME AND THE LAW IN LoNDON AND RURAL MIDDLESEX, C. 1660-1725, at 38-39, 54, 
83, 87, 174, 184-85 (1991). The legal authority of masters to beat their errant household employ-
ees frequently made resorting to formal sanctions unnecessary and also explains the lack of cases. 
Pp. 32, 44-46. 
36. See, e.g., Notes of the Lords' Committee on the Decay of Rents and Trade, 1669, reprinted 
in SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EcONOMIC DOCUMENTS 68, 70 (Joan Thirsk & J.P. Cooper eds., 
1972) (citing Mr. Childe, Nov. 4, 1669); see also T.S. AsHTON, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
ENGLAND: THE 18TH CENTURY 224 (1955) (parliament opposes statute); EDMUND s. MOR-
GAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 66, 
68 (1975) (local justices and investors realize the statute's year-long service provision discourages 
employment); JOHN u. NEF, INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND 1540-
1640, at 41, 47-48 (1940) (local magistrates not interested in enforcing law); E.P. THOMPSON, 
THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 274-75 (1963) (eighteenth-century judges dis-
like act). 
37. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 225-26 (Andrew Skinner abr. ed., Pelican 
Books 1970) (1776). 
38. See, e.g., RULE, supra note 30, at 96; JOHN STEVENSON, POPULAR DISTURBANCES IN 
ENGLAND 1700-1870, at 120 (1979); THOMPSON, supra note 36, at 253, 527. 
39. For condemnation by free market economists, see, for example, SMITH, supra note 37, at 
245. For arguments from prolabor economists, see E.H. PHELPS BROWN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
LABOR 116, 118, 124, 203-04 (1962); LINDER, supra note 33, at 46, 51-55; see also WAGE REGU-
LATION IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND, supra note 34, at 14 (citing condemnation by Thorold 
Rogers). 
40. See, e.g., CICELY HOWELL, LAND, FAMILY, AND INHERITANCE IN TRANSITION: 
KIBWORTH HARCOURT 1280-1700, at 168 (1983); RICHARD H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE 
RISE OF CAPITALISM 177 (1926); see also WAGE REGULATION IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND, 
supra note 34, at 14 (citing W.A. Hewins' view that seventeenth-century assessments had the 
effect of raising wages). 
41. G.D.H. COLE & RAYMOND POSTGATE, THE COMMON PEOPLE 1746-1946, at 208 (4th 
ed. 1949); JOHN L. & BARBARA HAMMOND, THE VILLAGE LABOURER, 1760-1832, at 133-44 
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The more general problem with reading the Statute of Artificers to 
imply a regime of coerced labor is that labor in the Tudor-Stuart pe-
riod was notoriously unsettled. The geographic mobility of English 
laborers, servants, youth, and the poor is well documented. 42 Admit-
tedly, the Steinfeld model can tolerate high levels of geographic mobil-
ity, because coerced labor is consistent with laborers and servants 
moving seasonally, annually, or at other intervals (pp. 27, 34), pro-
vided that at each new job the same statutory framework and premises 
applied. But the high levels of geographic mobility might rather point 
toward a regime in which labor discipline was challenged and labor 
freedom asserted against Steinfeldian unfreedom. From this view-
point, criminal sanctions and specific performance for labor contracts 
existed chiefly on paper, and local magistrates devoted more energy to 
moving the poor and underemployed to other parishes than to keeping 
laborers in place. 43 
In fact, much of the best social history of the past thirty years 
describes people who did not lead orderly, settled lives regulated by 
the work regimen of the Statute of Artificers. 
Beneath the surface stability of rural England, then, the vast placid open 
fields which catch the eye, was the seething mobility of forest squatters, 
itinerant craftsmen and building labourers, unemployed men and women 
seeking work, strolling players, minstrels and jugglers, pedlars and 
quack doctors, gipsies, vagabonds, tramps: congregated especially in 
London and the big cities, but also with footholds wherever newly-squat-
ted areas escaped from the machinery of the parish or in old-squatted 
areas where labour was in demand.44 
(1911); ROBERT W. MALCOLMSON, LIFE AND LABOUR IN ENGLAND 1700-1780, at 123 (1981); 
EsTHER MOIR, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 99 (1969); RULE, supra note 30, at 161. 
42. MALCOLMSON, supra note 41, at 71-74; MIGRATION AND SOCIETY IN EARLY MODERN 
ENGLAND (Peter Clark & David Souden eds., 1987); Peter Clark, The Migrant in Kentish Towns 
1580-1640, in CRISIS AND ORDER IN ENGLISH TOWNS 1500-1700, at 117 (Peter Clark & Paul 
Slack eds., 1972); M.J. Kitch, Capital and Kingdom: Migration to Later Stuan London, in 
LoNDON 1500-1700, at 224 (A.L. Beier & Roger Finlay eds., 1986); John Patten, Patterns of 
Migration and Movement of Labour to Three Pre-Industrial East Anglian Towns, in PRE-INDUS-
TRIAL ENGLAND: GEOGRAPHICAL EssAYS 143 (John Patten ed., 1979); Paul Slack, Vagrants 
and Vagrancy in England, 1598-1664, 27 EcoN. HIST. REV. 360 (2d ser. 1974); see PETER LAS-
LETT, FAMILY LIFE AND ILLICIT LOVE IN EARLIER GENERATIONS: EsSAYS IN HISTORICAL 
SOCIOLOGY 50 (1977) (presenting the argument that English villages saw high structural turno-
ver of their populations). 
43. "Probably most local authorities at any time showed more enthusiasm about harassing 
vagrants than in more constructive efforts." J.P. Cooper, Social and Economic Policies Under 
the Commonwealth, in THE INTERREGNUM: THE QUEST FOR SETTLEMENT 1646-1660, at 121, 
128 (Gerald E. Aylmer ed., 1972), reprinted in J.P. COOPER, LAND, MEN AND BELIEFS: STUD-
IES IN EARLY-MODERN HISTORY 222, 229 (Gerald E. Aylmer & Johns. Morrill eds., 1983). 
For types of selective enforcement of the labor laws, see CYNTHIA B. HERRUP, THE COMMON 
PEACE: PARTICIPATION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 
161-62 (1987) (availability oflabor laws as additional sanction against poor and laboring defend-
ants who had been acquitted by juries); SLACK, supra note 14, at 37-38 (provisions against labor 
mobility rarely applied against arriving young males whose labor was needed). 
44. CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN 48-49 (1975). 
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We have learned to look for these "masterless men," in forest, heath, 
and waste, on the roads and in markets, in coastal and wealden vil-
lages, in mining and weaving areas - in all the dark corners of the 
land where men could "live out of sight or out of slavery";45 in ale-
houses everywhere;46 in open parishes; in urban sanctuaries where the 
king's writ did not run;47 and even in southeastern and midlands 
champion-country villages with resident gentry. 
This undisciplined quality of early modern labor was not merely 
the consequence of administrative weakness and local recalcitrance. 
On the contrary, it grew out of the structure of the premodern English 
economy. Most persons, regardless of their legal or labor status (ser-
vants in husbandry, hired laborers, smallholders, craftsmen, the work-
ing poor) were sometimes unemployed and often underemployed.48 
Of necessity, they turned to second occupations,49 small gardens, petty 
industrial production, a range of craft skills, and such undesirable ac-
tivities - in the eyes of men of property - as keeping tippling 
houses, so begging, and committing crimes. This need to develop other 
sources of income was strongest in pastoral and woodland areas, but 
dual employment and multiple occupations were characteristic re-
sponses everywhere to endemic underemployment in a subsistence 
agrarian economy. Like geographic mobility, chronic underemploy-
ment and multiple employment undermined the statutory regimen of a 
dependent, stable workforce working twelve hours (excluding breaks) 
in summer and from dawn to nightfall in winter, under annual or six-
month retainers, for masters who possessed quasi-feudal rights of ju-
risdiction over their employees. 
However uncoerced English working life may have been in prac-
45. Id. at 46 (citing Gerard Winstanley). 
46. ALAN EVERfIT, CHANGE IN THE PROVINCES: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 41-42 
(1972); Peter Clark, The Alehouse and the Alternative Society, in PURITANS AND REVOLUTION-
ARIES: EssAYS IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY HISTORY PRESENTED TO CHRISTOPHER HILL 47 
(Donald Pennington & Keith Thomas eds., 1978) [hereinafter PURITANS AND REVOLUTION-
ARIES]; Clark, supra note 42, at 140-41. 
47. 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 339-46 (J. H. Baker ed., 94 Selden Socy. 1978); 
James R. Hertzler, The Abuse and Outlawing of Sanctuary for Debt in Seventeenth-Century Eng-
land, 14 HIST. J. 467 (1971). 
48. AsHTON, supra note 36, at 203; MALCOLMSON, supra note 41, at 37-38; MORGAN, supra 
note 36, at 63-67; D.C. Coleman, Labour in the English Economy of the Seventeenth Century, 8 
EcoN. HIST. REV. 280, 289-91 (2d ser. 1956), reprinted in 2 EsSAYS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY, 
supra note 11, at 291, 301-03. 
49. P. 35; AsHTON, supra note 36, at 202-03; Alan Everitt, Farm Labourers, in 4 THE AGRA· 
RIAN HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES: 1500-1640, at 396, 425-29 (Joan Thirsk ed., 1967); 
MALCOLMSON, supra note 41, at 38-46; RULE, supra note 30, at 12-16. The leading authority on 
new agricultural and industrial alternatives is Dr. Joan Thirsk, some of whose relevant work is 
found in JOAN THIRSK, EcoNOMIC POLICY AND PROJECTS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CON-
SUMER SOCIETY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (1978), and in chapters 13, 15 and 16 of JOAN 
THIRSK, THE RURAL EcONOMY OF ENGLAND (1984). 
SO. Clark, supra note 46, at 47, 49, 52-53 (poor craftsmen and husbandmen keeping 
alehouses). 
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tice, such freedom does not undermine Steinfeld's position that a sta-
ble, coerced labor force was the legal ideal. "It is not uncommon for a 
society to be torn between ideal and reality, and the people of early 
seventeenth-century England experienced this tension to an unusual 
degree."51 For Steinfeld, the reality was that labor was coerced when 
necessary. The significance of the statutory labor regime is thus the 
availability of coercion rather than its consistent application. But it 
also is likely that the government officials and men of property who 
drafted and enforced the Tudor-Stuart scheme of labor regulation rec-
ognized the divergence between ideal and reality and knew that stable 
labor was, at best, a dated medieval ideal that grew less practical with 
each decade. 52 If so, rather than embodying, recapitulating, or reas-
serting a particular legal or social theory, Tudor-Stuart labor regula-
tion may instead represent the government's short- and middle-term, 
ameliorative efforts to respond to a series of perceived domestic social-
welfare crises. 
Thus, Steinfeld reads the Statute of Artificers as an attempt to reas-
sert and extend the notions of tied, coerced labor articulated in earlier 
legislation, notions that local justices applied as needed for almost two 
centuries and masters and employers accepted everywhere (pp. 63-64). 
But other historians see the Statute as an attempt to respond to short-
term crises, particularly in the wool and textile industries. 53 They see 
the Statute as part of larger, ongoing legislative programs to address 
crime, poverty, vagrancy, squatting, unchecked urban expansion, unli-
censed alehouses, price inflation, depression in the textile and other 
industries, unemployment and underemployment, silted harbors, agri-
cultural instability, rural depopulation and enclosure, failure to attend 
church, ignorance about matters of faith, unsupervised preaching, mis-
directed charitable impulses among the gentry, and so on. 54 Many of 
these programs, and much of the economic theory of the time, stressed 
the need to put the poor to work. 55 But this impulse often did not take 
51. DAVID UNDERDOWN, REVEL, RIOT, AND REBELLION: POPULAR POLITICS AND CUL-
TURE IN ENGLAND 1603-1660, at 9 (1987). 
52. See DYER, supra note 10, at 224 (suggesting that fifteenth-century labor regulation was 
intended to have an effect, but that it was highly impractical and says more about ruling-class 
social anxieties than about how labor was in fact regulated); see also Elaine Clark, Medieval 
Labor Law and English Local Courts, 27 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 330, 346-47 (1983) (suggesting that 
medieval labor law was applied with some flexibility). 
53. WAGE REGULATION IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND, supra note 34, at 10-11, 16-17. 
54. See, e.g., THOMAS G. BARNES, SOMERSET 1625-1640, at 172-202 (1961) (enforcement of 
poor relief and related laws, including labor laws, temporarily intensified to comply with compre-
hensive Caroline Book of Orders); MOIR, supra note 41, at 37-46, 59-64 (poor laws and labor 
oversight part of larger framework of social welfare legislation); SLACK, supra note 14, at 22-25 
(reaching similar conclusions); TAWNEY, supra note 40, at 260 (making similar arguments). 
55. JOYCE 0. APPLEBY, EcONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND 140-46 (1978); AsHTON, supra note 36, at 203; CHRISTOPHER HILL, SOCIETY AND 
PURITANISM IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY ENGLAND 266-67 (1964); MORGAN, supra note 36, at 67, 
320-25; SLACK, supra note 14, at 27, 39; Coleman, supra note 48, at 291-92, 298, 301-03. 
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the form of enforcing the work regimen set out in the Statute of Artifi-
cers. Historians have argued about the mix of coercive, humanitarian, 
and rhetorical impulses that infused the Statute and Tudor-Stuart leg-
islation and enforcement generally.56 But it is clear that in practice 
the Statute of Artificers was not uniformly applied to coerce labor. 
The political-administrative interpretations of other historians are not 
incompatible with Steinfeld's longer-term ideological and analytical 
claims, but they do suggest very different values and aims for the labor 
regulation of the period. 
Regardless of the strength of the evidence supporting Steinfeld's 
claim that labor was significantly coerced or that legislators, judges, 
and employers thought it could be coerced, his focus on coercion and 
"unfreedom" is strikingly important. Legal freedom and unfreedom 
were concepts at war with one another. There were three elements to 
this seventeenth-century paradox. First, most workers in early mod-
em England were formally under some legal compulsion, as Steinfeld 
stresses (pp. 15-121, 243 n.36, 244 n.46). Second, the contrary notion 
that all Englishmen were free was widespread and increasingly impor-
tant - indeed, contemporaries saw freedom as a defining characteris-
tic of English law and English identity (pp. 95-101). Yet, third, 
English traders and settlers over the seventeenth century accommo-
dated themselves to a labor regime of slavery - total unfreedom. 
Steinfeld's discussion of how English labor practices were reconciled 
with the growing ideology of English freedom is one of his finest (pp. 
101-21). The reconciliation of the ideology of freedom with the new 
practice of colonial slavery is a matter outside the scope of his book; it 
is perhaps a more difficult issue, and one whose legacy is familiar and 
tragic for Americans. 
The ideological emphasis on the freedom of the English was cen-
tral to the legal definition of early modem freedom. Granted, pride in 
the freedom provided by common law was not new. All over medieval 
Europe, the doctrine arose that town air made one free, and English 
law applied a version of this. 57 Bracton, the great legal treatise of the 
early to mid-thirteenth century, contains references to the law's "fa-
vour for freedom" in dubious cases involving status,58 and such emi-
nent later jurists as Fortescue adopted favor libertatis as a proof text of 
the virtue of English law. But we now know that this medieval doc-
trine merely represented borrowed Roman learning, and that its value 
to medieval theory lay in protecting free men from wrongful degrada-
56. SLACK, supra note 14, at 67-76 (including bibliography to the standard works); Valerie 
Pearl, Puritans and Poor Relief: The London Workhouse, 1649-1660, in PURITANS AND REVO· 
LUTIONARIES, supra note 46, at 206-11 (citing Leonard, Webbs, Tawney, Hampson, James, and 
Jordan on the impulses behind poor relief and government policy). 
57. 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 36-37 (George E. Woodbine 
ed. & Samuel E. Thome trans., 1968). 
58. Id. at 300; 3 BRACTON, supra note 57, at 91, 109 (1977). 
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tion to servitude, rather than in fostering freedom as such. 59 
By contrast, the Tudor-Stuart talk of freedom and common law 
rights was an important extension, in emphasis, volume, and conse-
quences, of medieval rhetoric (pp. 95-101). "Rights-talk" and the per-
ceived threat of enslavement were discussed in varied contexts. In 
some contexts, the argument held that an oppressed English group 
had already been "enslaved."60 More often, the argument centered on 
one or another enemy seeking to enslave the virtuous English, who 
had managed to retain their birthright of freedom. Nor was this dis-
cussion of rights and freedom the exclusive domain of the political 
elite or of constitutional theorists. Litigation involved even laborers 
and husbandmen, and they too spoke the language of common law 
rights and freedom. 61 
Somehow contemporaries reconciled the widespread notion that 
the English were free with the palpable fact that English men and wo-
men toiled in coercive labor. The traditional account of labor law, 
however, simply distinguishes personal status from labor institutions, 
thereby avoiding the question of how contemporaries accepted such 
dissonant answers. Steinfeld's subtler and more convincing approach 
frames an ideological model of freedom that rejects the dichotomy be-
tween free and unfree, borrowed from modem law.62 Instead, his map 
of early modem status ranges from free (men of property), to coerced 
but free (all English labor), to rightless (aliens), to unfree (slaves, as 
well as subjects of foreign despots) (pp. 99-104). The elegance of 
Steinfeld's argument derives from his illustration that contemporaries 
viewed laborers and servants simultaneously as free and coerced, but 
that coercion did not imply that the laborer was unfree in the sense 
that a slave was unfree (pp. 95-101). As Hobbes noted in a related 
59. JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE 103-05 (Stanley B. Chrimes ed. & 
trans., 1942) (c. 1468-1471). Sir Edward Coke followed Fortescue's use of the doctrine. 1 ED-
WARD COKE, THE FIRsr PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND§ 193, at 
*124b. The Roman origins, Bractonian formulation, and medieval uses of the doctrine are set 
out in PAUL HYAMS, KINGS, LoRDS AND PEASANTS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: THE COMMON 
LAW OF VILLEINAGE IN THE TwELFTH AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES 203-19 (1980). The 
doctrine's later evolution is traced in Baker, supra note 31, at 11-12, 14, 17-18. 
60. See, e.g., PURITANISM AND LIBERTY 61 (A.S.P. Woodhouse ed., 1992) (Oct. 29, 1647 
comment of Col. Rainsborough in Putney Debates that "the old law of England ... enslaves the 
people of England .... "); SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EcONOMIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 36, at 
183-84 (citing Richard Baxter's 1691 view of "the poor enslaved husbandmen ... for none are so 
servilely dependent (save household servants and ambitious expectants) as they are on their land-
lords"); TAWNEY, supra note 40, at 254 (citing Gerard Winstanley's complaint that, despite 
victory over the king, "we ... remayne slaves still to the kingly power in the hands of lords of 
manors"). 
61. James Sharpe, The People and the Law, in POPULAR CULTURE IN SEVENTEENTH-CEN-
TURY 244, 245 (Barry Reay ed., 1985). 
62. Not that the dichotomy is exclusively a modem formulation. It is found, for instance, in 
JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES I.3 and in 2 BRACTON, supra note 57, at 29. Steinfeld's premise is that, 
unlike their nineteenth-century analogues, the earlier formulations in fact created hybrid statuses 
of persons free but subject to coercion. 
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context, "Feare and Liberty are consistent .... "63 
This redefinition of the spectrum of freedom has considerable sig-
nificance, both for Steinfeld's argument about free labor and for an 
understanding of the first steps the English colonies took toward 
adopting slave labor. By viewing early modem labor as free, that is, 
by taking its rhetorical claims seriously, we can understand the po-
tency of the common law, even to the poor, and the availability of that 
common law as a resource that might occasionally support their 
claims against men of property. 64 By viewing early modem freedom 
as compatible with coercion, we can make sense of long-abandoned 
doctrines such as specific performance and criminal sanctions for 
breach of labor contracts. Labor coercion as a part of early modem 
freedom also helps explain the consistent use of assigned labor service, 
bridewells, and parish apprenticeships in England's unique, nation-
wide poor relief scheme. Finally, by appreciating the existence of co-
ercion in English notions of freedom, we can begin to understand how 
the common law accepted racial slavery in the English colonies and, 
arguably, in England for a while.65 By virtue of its contribution to the 
intellectual and legal underpinnings of the move to slavery in the com-
mon law world, this redefinition of the spectrum of early modem legal 
status is among the most important contributions of Steinfeld's book. 66 
Ill. STEINFELD'S ARGUMENT FOR THE INVENTION 
OF FREE LABOR 
The other part of Steinfeld's argument explains how the early mod-
em paradigm of coerced labor yielded to the modem notion of free 
labor over the course of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies. At this point, his emphasis switches to colonial America and 
American evidence. He contends that early English settlers borrowed 
their notions of labor from English law, so that all (white) seven-
teenth-century laborers in the colonies worked under the same regime 
of practical unfreedom as in England. But by the early eighteenth cen-
tury hired laborers and craftsmen in the colonies were accepted as free 
and mobile; the law ceased to enforce specific performance or criminal 
sanctions against their failure to find or complete work (pp. 50-51, 
112-13, 121, 230 n.72). Only servants and apprentices remained sub-
63. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 262 (Crawford B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) 
(1651). 
64. John Brewer and John Styles, Introduction, AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE: THE ENG-
LISH AND THEIR LAW IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 11, 14-20 (John 
Brewer & John Styles eds., 1980); Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in 
ALBION'S FATAL TREE 17, 39 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975). 
65. SEYMOUR DRESCHER, CAPITALISM AND ANTISLAVERY 35 (1987). 
66. For the leading interpretations, see, for example, DAVIS, supra note 21; WINTHROP D. 
JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812 
(1968). 
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ject to coercion. Steinfeld completes his argument by explaining how, 
as part of a contentious and politicized process in the nineteenth cen-
tury, certain labor institutions came to be seen as unfree and therefore 
illegitimate. 
Why legal coercion was already deemed inappropriate for laborers 
and craftsmen by the eighteenth century, however, is a difficult ques-
tion, and a definitive answer may come from social and economic 
rather than legal history. Perhaps the new freedom related to the rela-
tive availability of land. With a declining birthrate and rising real 
wages in late seventeenth-century England, opportunities were less 
bleak at home, and it grew harder to entice prospective migrants to the 
colonies. 67 Moreover, there was little incentive for colonial laborers, 
especially freedmen, to remain under a coercive labor regime, with 
land already taken or exhausted in the areas of old colonial settlement 
in the Tidewater and a growing native-born population. 68 New land 
was suddenly available because the frontier pushed into Indian lands 
in the early eighteenth century. Under such circumstances, it would 
have been difficult to keep laborers by relying principally on the stick 
of legal coercion. The materialist explanation, however, raises as 
many questions as it answers. For instance, it may be that eighteenth-
century America paradoxically was characterized not by abundant 
land, but rather by overcrowding and diminished opportunity. 69 If so, 
masters relaxed their disciplinary rights because they had market-
based alternatives to legal coercion. On the other hand, accepting the 
traditional view that land and opportunity were abundant, we describe 
circumstances that, in other cultures, have led to intensified labor 
discipline. 70 
A better explanation for the new freedom of colonial wage laborers 
67. ALLAN KULIKOFF, THE AGRARIAN ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 190 (1992); 
Russell R. Menard, British Migration to the Chesapeake Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, in 
COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE SOCIETY 99, 108-11 (Lois G. Carr et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter 
Menard, British Migration]; Russell R. Menard, From Servants to Slaves: The Transformation of 
the Chesapeake Labor System, 16 S. STUD. 355, 374-80 (1977) [hereinafter Menard, Servants to 
Slaves]; see also DAVID HARRIS SACKS, THE WIDENING GATE: BRISTOL AND THE ATLANTIC 
EcoNOMY, 1450-1700, at 282-302 (1991) (suggesting that a decline in religious persecution eased 
pressure on English servants to emigrate). 
68. ALLAN KULIKOFF, TOBACCO AND SLAVES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN CUL-
TURES IN THE CHESAPEAKE, 1680-1800, at 36-42 (1986); Lois G. Carr & Russell R. Menard, 
Immigration and Opportunity: The Freedman in Early Colonial Maryland, in THE CHESAPEAKE 
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 206, 224 (Thaddeus w. Tate & David Ammerman eds., 1979); 
Menard, British Migration, supra note 67, at 111-12; Russell R. Menard, From Servant to Free-
holder: Status Mobility and Property Accumulation in Seventeenth-Century Maryland, 30 WM. & 
MARY Q. 37 (3d ser. 1973); Lorena S. Walsh, Servitude and Opportunity in Charles County, 
Maryland, 1658-1705, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND POLITICS IN EARLY MARYLAND 111 (Aubrey c. 
Land et al. eds., 1977). 
69. Kenneth Lockridge, Land, Population and the Evolution of New England Society 1630-
1790, PAST & PRESENT, Apr. 1968, at 62. 
70. See Robert Brenner, Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Indus-
trial Europe, PAST & PRESENT, Feb. 1976, at 30, 38-41, reprinted in THE BRENNER DEBATE 10, 
20-23 (T.H. Aston & C.H.E. Philpin eds., 1985); Domar, supra note 8; see also Menard, Servants 
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relates it to the spread of slave labor, which exploded in numerical 
importance, especially in the southern colonies.71 Suddenly, re-
straining white laborers and craftsmen was less important for masters 
because they had slaves as an alternative workforce. It was also 
harder to coerce white laborers because the ideological foundations of 
slavery became exclusively racial; by definition white labor was free, 
though the precise definition of freedom had yet to be developed. But 
under any view, the result of the new freedom of laborers and 
craftsmen was that only servants and apprentices were still unfree in 
the traditional sense (pp. 121, 130-33, 159-60). 
Meanwhile, the legal theory justifying the practical unfreedom of 
servants and apprentices continued to be based on a combination of 
traditional property and jurisdictional notions. Steinfeld devotes con-
siderable effort to showing that both common law (pp. 55-87) and 
early American law (pp. 55-57, 87-91) deemed coercion to be permissi-
ble because employers had both a leaselike property interest in the 
labor of their employees and jurisdictional rights to govern of those 
who labored under them. 
Steinfeld's two alleged rationales for labor coercion - property 
and jurisdiction - did not entirely persuade me. His emphasis on the 
writ of covenant as a basis for the proprietary view of human labor 
distinguishes too sharply between covenant and other real actions on 
the basis of the alleged passing of property (pp. 28, 73-74, 157), and it 
slights the fact that employers increasingly used personal actions of 
the trespass and case families. 72 The intriguing claim that late medie-
val labor was a community resource characterizes a few, isolated cases 
(pp. 5, 61, 63), but the typical suit against fugitive laborers alleged that 
they had abandoned obligations to particular employers, not to the 
manorial community. Steinfeld's effort to classify labor as a leaselike 
interest is suggestive, particularly in explaining the terminology of 
standard-form eighteenth-century indentures, 73 but it is far from con-
clusive. Similarly, the use of "wardship" in the sixteenth century does 
not, despite Steinfeld's claims (pp. 69, 72), prove that the common law 
conceived of property interests in persons, but rather was one of many 
examples of "fiscal feudalism" by which the Tudor-Stuart Crown 
sought to extract new taxes and levies based on serviceable ancient 
to Slaves, supra note 67, at 356-58, 388 (speculating whether the free land thesis explains Ameri-
can servitude). 
71. KULIKOFF, supra note 68, at 40, 45, 64-66, 320; MORGAN, supra note 36, at 299-309. 
72. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 360-80 (3d ed. 1990); 
Gareth H. Jones, Per Quod Servitium Amisit, 74 L.Q. REV. 39, 45-53 (1958). For modern echoes 
of this proprietarial approach, see I.R.C. v. Hambrook, [1956] 2 Q.B. 641, 660-66 (C.A.) (Den· 
ning, L.J.); Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens, [1955] 1 Q.B. 275, 282 (C.A.). 
73. Pp. 75-76, 81-87, 156-57; see also Carr & Menard, supra note 68, at 229 (reference to 
residential freedmen as "belonging to" their former masters). 
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legal doctrines. 74 
As for Steinfeld's jurisdictional rationale, patriarchal jurisdiction 
was clearly in decline, as shown by its failure to account for the mas-
terless men of the Tudor social landscape, but patriarchy revived in a 
variety of contexts well after 1750. Early captains of industry, such as 
Ambrose Crowley and Josiah Wedgwood, sought to impose labor reg-
ulatory schemes that rested exclusively on the rights of governance 
appurtenant to a head of household, 75 and jurisdiction and household 
governance were critical elements in the nineteenth-century support 
for slavery. Accordingly, patriarchal jurisdiction was a consistent, but 
very nuanced, theme in legal thought. Steinfeld insufficiently develops 
its relationship to the changing discourse about labor. 
These are small points, however. Steinfeld is utterly persuasive 
about the compatibility of the property rationale with the capitalist 
ethos of the eighteenth century. He rightly begins by stressing enclo-
sure, by which laborers lost common lands and rights.76 At the level 
of high theory, the counterpart to this carving up of the remaining 
commons was the new "possessive individualism." One might expect 
that individualism, which acknowledged the juridically equal property 
and contract rights of all persons, would imply an ideology of "free 
labor" similar to that of the nineteenth century (pp. 105-06). But 
eighteenth-century individualists did not blush at continuing to coerce 
labor from their servants, apprentices, and slaves. Paradoxically, it 
may have been easier for individualists to accept slavery. Since blacks 
entered the English world from abroad, racism and xenophobia al-
lowed theorists simply to ignore claims of humanity. As for legal con-
siderations, the Romanesque doctrine of enslavement by captivity, 
which long occupied a wholly ornamental place in English law,77 
seemed sufficient to justify plantation slavery - even after most slaves 
were born within the colonies. But the coercion of servants was 
harder to explain in an age of possessive individualism: servants were 
not outsiders but English, and they and their labor ought to have been 
fully free. 
Steinfeld's contribution to intellectual history deepens with his ex-
planation of how coercion of formally free labor was consistent with 
the new capitalist ethos. Possessive individualism held only that each 
person had a property interest in his own labor; nothing constrained 
74. Joel Hurstfield, The Profits of Fiscal Feudalism, 1541-1602, 8 EcoN. HIST. REV. 53 (2d 
ser. 1955). 
75. AsHTON, supra note 36, at 212. 
76. See pp. 34-35; 1 JOHN H. CLAPHAM, AN EcONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN 
114-27 (2d ed. 1930); MALCOMSON, supra note 41, at 23-27, 32-34 .. 
77. 2 BRACTON, supra note 57, at 30-31; see Guyora Binder, Masters, Slaves, and Emancipa-
tion, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435, 1441 (1989) (discussing what he terms "the cowardly 
contract"). 
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the right of an individual to give, sell, or lease his own labor.78 Stein-
feld shows that theorists of possessive individualism could justify the 
alienation of one person's labor to another in institutional forms that 
entailed coercion precisely because labor had long been legally regu-
lated by analogy to property interests.79 Accordingly, individualists 
could conclude that an apprentice or servant was fully free. By enter-
ing service, he voluntarily alienated, as any property owner could, the 
commodity within his ownership - his labor. 80 Steinfeld nicely fills 
out the possessive individualist thesis by explaining the older legal ar-
guments available to eighteenth-century individualists. His argument, 
moreover, is consistent with the emergence of the individualist justifi-
cation of plantation slavery. In De Jure Naturae et Gentium, 
Pufendorf conceded the weakness of the familiar "capture in just war" 
doctrine and instead revived the more obscure doctrine that "self-sale" 
legitimated slavery. 81 
Steinfeld next shows how the map of free and unfree labor fell 
short of the modern, dichotomous picture of free and slave as late as 
the American Revolution and after. Landowners and wage workers 
were free, blacks slaves were not free, and servants and apprentices 
remained in between - free but subject to considerable legal disabili-
ties and coercion. Somehow, however, in the fifty years after the 
Revolution, indentured servitude and apprenticeship came to be per-
ceived as forms of slavery. Upon losing their institutional legitimacy, 
78. See generally C.B. MACPHERSON, THE PoLmCAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDU· 
ALISM 214-20 (1962). But see KEITH TRIBE, LAND, LABOUR AND EcONOMIC DISCOURSE 50, 
51 (1978) (criticizing possessive individualism for failing to distinguish between sale of labor and 
sale of the capacity to labor, and thus for failing to distinguish the servant from the slave). 
The famous examples of whether suicide or self-sale into slavery was permissible, on the 
grounds that they represented alienation or disposal of the property interest in oneself, illustrate 
the outer bounds of possessive individualism. Theorists rejected both options. As for slavery, 
theorists wondered what infinitely large consideration could suffice for such sale - especially 
since the money received for one's freedom would inevitably revert to the payor in his capacity as 
slaveowner. Pp. 100-01. As for suicide, natural law arguments about the sacredness of life were 
invoked to forbid it, thus rescuing individualism from its own logic. JOHN DUNN, THE POLIT· 
!CAL THEORY OF JOHN LoCKE 88-89, 125 (1969); MACPHERSON, supra, at 220. 
79. Pp. 5-6, 90-91, 105-11. Consistent with this, the individualist theorists often built their 
arguments around property metaphors. DUNN, supra note 78, at 255. 
80. Pp. 79. 99-101. For examples of the market in indentured labor, see, for example, DAVID 
w. GALENSON, WHITE SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 102-13 (1981) (indentured servants 
enter labor market voluntarily; terms and length of service vary with their skills, gender, and 
destination); Menard, Servants to Slaves, supra note 67, at 107-08 (indentured servants bargain 
for different lengths of service and destinations). But see Farley Grubb, The Market for Inden-
tured Immigrants: Evidence on the Efficiency of Forward-Labor Contracting in Philadelphia, 
1745-1773, 45 J. EcoN. HIST. 855 (1985) (arguing against the sensitivity of labor markets in the 
eighteenth century). For the operation of an efficient labor market for nonindentured wage la· 
bor, see pp. 108-11, as well as Carr & Menard, supra note 68, at 212-14 (varying terms for 
freedmen's labor and sharecropping contracts). 
81. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM 935-36 (C.H. & W.A. 
Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688). For the wide availability of Pufendorf in the colonies, see WIL· 
LIAM H. BRYSON, CENSUS OF LAW BOOKS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA xviii, 29 (1978). 
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they were quickly and quietly abolished in the first third of the nine-
teenth century. 
Steinfeld concludes his argument with the little-known story of the 
antebellum emancipation of compelled free labor (pp. 147-72). He at-
tributes this legal emancipation - and it was almost exclusively legal, 
because the number of apprentices and indentured servants had al-
ready declined sharply - to the ideology and behavior of early nine-
teenth-century working people. Drawing on the scholarship 
concerning early nineteenth-century urban craftsmen and American 
class formation generally, a body of work to which he has already 
contributed, 82 Steinfeld shows that working people absorbed some of 
the radical, antihierarchical ideas of the Revolution and deployed 
these ideas to challenge indentured servitude (pp. 123-27). The crux 
of Steinfeld's argument is that indentures and apprenticeships disap-
peared because of ideological rejection, not because the market for 
them changed significantly. Indentured servants continued to be 
brought to the middle colonies, with interruptions only for the 
Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, and masters continued to 
purchase them, even in states where slavery was unpopular or prohib-
ited (pp. 11-13, 164-65). Steinfeld reconciles antislavery sentiment 
with the increasing repudiation of indentured servitude by unpacking 
a number of fascinating encounters between employers, supported by 
legal precedent, and republican journeymen, sometimes backed by 
lawyers and merchants (pp. 164-77). A form of trickle-up emancipa-
tion resulted, and by the 1820s legal authorities began to reject the 
ancient forms of coerced labor. 
What are we to make of this engrossing narrative? Once again, 
there are a few unanswered questions. Indentured servants continued 
to be imported, as Steinfeld says, but the composition of the servant 
pool changed over the eighteenth century. Increasingly, arriving ser-
vants were skilled craftsmen, German families, or convicted English 
felons. 83 Steinfeld acknowledges this (pp. 89, 226 n.20), but he does 
not address whether and how the identity of the servants affected legal 
formulations of their status. For instance, did the fact that German 
families typically arrived under a different legal form of indenture84 
color the views of either the courts or the ideologically engaged urban 
workers? Given the nativist strand in early nineteenth-century cul-
82. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 335 (1989); see Gary J. Komblith, The Artisanal Response to Capitalist Transformation, 10 
J. EARLY REPUBLIC 315 (1990) (surveying the literature). 
83. A. ROGER EKIRCH, BOUND FOR AMERICA: THE TRANSPORTATION OF BRITISH CON-
VICTS TO THE COLONIES, 1718-1775 (1987); SHARON V. SALINGER, "To SERVE WELL AND 
FAITHFULLY": LABOR AND INDENTURED SERVANTS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1682-1800 (1987); 
David W. Galenson, The Rise and Fall of Indentured Servitude in the Americas: An Economic 
Analysis, 44 J. EcoN. HIST. 1, 12-13 (1984). 
84. Pp. 164, 198 n.6; KULIKOFF, supra note 67, at 193. 
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ture, did the German arrivals face initial indifference to their status, 
and did these immigrants articulate their own notions of freedom?85 
In view of the importance of the rural nexus of American capitalism to 
recent scholarship, was there opposition to indentured servitude from 
farmers as well as urban craftsmen, and, if not, why did rural republi-
canism develop differently from its urban variant?86 
These mere quibbles, however, did not prevent this reader's enjoy-
ment of Steinfeld's original, vigorously argued position. Refreshingly, 
the book does not end on a note of triumphant whiggery. Steinfeld 
stresses the centrality of the judicial repudiation of slavery-related 
cases, such as Mary Clark, in which indentures had been forced on 
freed slaves. 87 He steers clear of an encomium to the rejection of co-
erced free labor, instead devoting his last substantive discussion to 
midcentury peonage. Not surprisingly, such institutions as Chinese 
coolie labor and Indian peonage in the territories conquered from 
Mexico were only hesitantly abolished. 88 Steinfeld's brief survey of 
the latter in particular is a reminder of the racial and ethnic context in 
which freedom was inscribed. It offers an appropriately ambiguous 
note on which to end the history of a legal ideology of unfreedom. 
IV. STEINFELD AS CRITICAL LEGAL HISTORIAN OF FREE LABOR 
Twenty-five years ago The Invention of Free Labor would not have 
been written; sixty to one hundred years ago, many comparable books 
were written. The turn-of-the-century scholarship differed in many 
ways from Steinfeld's work, most importantly in that it sought to ad-
dress labor relations and poverty through legal evidence rather than to 
address legal ideas directly. Given the extraordinary archival wealth 
of English law, the social and economic historians necessarily turned 
to legal evidence, and their efforts resulted in a body of distinguished 
scholarship on the legal history of labor and poor laws. 89 
For the better part of this century, however, labor historians 
spurned legal evidence as crude or, at best, only a starting point. His-
torians learned to go beyond the statutes, cases, and legal handbooks 
that, along with literary evidence, had formed the trellis for Fabian 
85. Steven J. Ross, The Transformation of Republican Ideology, 10 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 323, 
330 (1990). 
86. See generally KULIKOFF, supra note 67. 
87. Pp. 177-79; see also PAUL A. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION 88, 92, 96 (1981); 
Paul Finkelman, Evading the Ordinance: The Persistence of Bondage in Indiana and Illinois, 9 J. 
EARLY REPUBLIC 21, 35-48 (1989). 
88. Pp. 179-84; Galenson, supra note 83, at 15-24. 
89. CLAPHAM, supra note 76; HAMMOND & HAMMOND, supra note 41; MARGARET JAMES, 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND POLICY DURING THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1640-1660 (2d ed. 1965); 
E.M. LEONARD, THE EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLISH POOR RELIEF (1900); SIDNEY WEBB & 
BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH LoCAL GOVERNMENT: ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY: PART I, 
THE OLD POOR LAW (1927). 
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labor histories. Later historians turned to new evidence, ranging from 
parish registers to handbills and other accounts that captured humble 
Englishmen in their own words. Historians learned the tools of other, 
related disciplines, ranging from demography and development eco-
nomics to cultural anthropology and feminist theory. With new evi-
dence and tools, there seemed no need to base the history of work and 
working people on legal records, legal institutions, and gentry percep-
tions. For two generations, scholars offered fine reconstructions of la-
bor and the world of those who labored but little on how the law 
conceived of labor. 
Steinfeld's book is important in part because of its renewed atten-
tion to specifically legal issues. Steinfeld views labor law not for its use 
as social evidence, and not as a set of doctrines that are interesting for 
their own sake, but rather as the embodiment of competing social and 
ideological ideas shaping beliefs and actions. From this perspective, 
Steinfeld is able to examine five centuries of labor law and to make 
meaningful generalizations about it. Steinfeld's aims and perspective 
identify his work as part of the critical legal studies (CLS) tradition, 
and this book represents a leading contribution to the growing body of 
ambitious CLS legal histories.9° 
As CLS history, the book comes with a few signature features. 
Most obvious is the vocabulary. Like many CLS authors, Steinfeld 
writes of "appropriating" concepts and doctrines (pp. 90, 94, 169); the 
law in action is termed "experiential" (pp. 101, 160); ideas are "opera-
tionalized" (pp. 5, 94, 160, 163, 170); notions and legal formulations 
mediate the "contradictory" (pp. 94, 137, 160, 186-87) pressures and 
deep "tensions" (pp. 105, 131); answers are "contingent" (p. 160); and 
the "play of interest" leads to any final result (pp. 155, 171). But be-
yond its terminological influence, Steinfeld's legal history includes two 
valuable CLS themes. First, in his narrative, legal formulations are 
contingent, provisional, and contested. Second, Steinfeld focuses on 
the changing contours of notions like "free labor" as a fundamentally 
American story, in which American workers and, secondarily, courts 
were the critical agents of legal change. I will consider the implica-
tions of each claim. 
To some, contingency is no longer a theme, but a historiographic 
cliche. To others, the notion of freedom being contingent or contra-
dictory seems itself unclear. After all, to adherents of Whiggish his-
tory, there is little contingent or contradictory about the unfreedom of 
the medieval serf, the American plantation slave, or the Czech or 
90. Along with Steinfeld, a leading CLS labor historian is William E. Forbath, The Ambigui-
ties of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767. Many of the 
best known historical CLS works are cited in Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the 
Writing of American Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 1019, 1031 n.73 (1993) (reviewing MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY (1992)). 
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Hungarian living under the Stalinist boot. But Steinfeld's examination 
of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century labor coercion is a fine case 
study for the argument that freedom and servitude are not inevitable 
or unchanging, and that they are not dependent on particular eco-
nomic stages or institutions - in short, that freedom is contingent. 
Freedom is a socially constructed, ascribed category, and its legal for-
mulation is the result of mediation by different actors and interests. 
This argument will be familiar to devotees of CLS history and un-
convincing to many of its critics. What I found most persuasive about 
Steinfeld's reconstruction of freedom and unfreedom is how well it fits 
with another, controversial area of legal history that few CLS have 
addressed: medieval freedom.91 A brief outline of English medieval 
legal status serves to underscore the extent to which Steinfeld's de-
scription of freedom as a disputed, multiplicitous, and shifting notion 
can enrich the analysis of an earlier period. 
At the time of Domesday Book (1086), there were a few slaves 
(servi); nationally, the figure was approximately ten percent.92 A vari-
ety of occupational and regional classifications served to label peas-
ants, but most were free in that they were full members of a village 
community - the opposite of a slave. At the same time, however, 
"the [Domesday] villanus both is and is not a free man,"93 for the term 
"free man" also appeared in contemporary records to indicate a per-
son entitled, unlike most villani, to direct access to public institutions, 
most notably the courts of shire and hundred. Other, local status 
compilations also portrayed an agrarian world with numerous status 
classes of dependent persons that ranged from fully free men to chattel 
slaves.94 
Over the course of the twelfth century, this broad middle range of 
status classes was squeezed until the legal writers saw a world of only 
free and serf. A series of local processes that left no single "smoking 
gun" seems to have emancipated Domesday's slaves while degrading 
the larger class of "free" peasants.95 By the early thirteenth century, 
91. But see Guyora Binder, Angels and Infidels: Hierarchy and Historicism in Mediel'a/ 
Legal History, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 527 (1986). 
92. HALLAM, supra note 7, at 22; H.B. Clarke, Domesday Slavery (Adjusted for Slaves}, 1 
MIDLAND HIST., 37, 39-42 (1972) (reviewing THE DOMESDAY GEOGRAPHY OF MIDLAND ENG· 
LAND (H.C. Darby & l.B. Terrett eds., 2d ed. 1971)). 
93. FREDERIC w. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 43 (1966); see also Hatcher, 
supra note 6, at 28; Rodney H. Hilton, Freedom and Villeinage in England, PAST & PRESENT, 
July 1965, at 3, 4-5, reprinted in PEASANTS, KNIGHTS AND HERETICS 174, 175-76 (R.H. Hilton 
ed., 1976). 
94. See, e.g., ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS: 1042-1189, at 813-33 (David c. Douglas 
& George W. Greenaway eds., 1953) (agrarian and manorial surveys); MAITLAND, supra note 
93, at 36-46, 327-32; P.D.A. Harvey, Rectitudines Singularum Personarum and Gere/a, 108 
ENG. HIST. REV. l (1993); David A.E. Pelteret, Two Old English Lists of Serft, 48 MEDIEVAL 
STUD. 470, 474-75 (1986). 
95. MAITLAND, supra note 93, at 35; 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 430-31; 
TITOW, supra note 11, at 57. Hatcher has recently challenged whether this meant any change in 
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the new common law defined freedom to exclude perhaps most of the 
peasantry.96 Vil/anus no longer referred to the ordinary villager, as it 
had in Domesday, but to the unfree villager or common law villein, 
while servus implied the serf or villein rather than Domesday's chattel 
slave. Meanwhile, local histories show that the meaningful distinction 
in reality may not have been between free and unfree peasants, but 
rather between peasants, free or not, with guaranteed access to land on 
favorable customary terms and the growing class of legally free land-
less laborers and cottagers.97 But whatever the advantages of ma-
norial membership, even on unfree terms, we also know that peasants 
resisted and occasionally purchased their way out of unfree personal 
status and its stigma. 98 
Moreover, the overlap between personal status and land tenure, 
and the new jurisdictional definitions imposed by the common law 
complicated the map of legal freedom.99 By the mid-thirteenth cen-
tury, the new common law system defined unfreedom or villeinage 
largely as the denial of access to the common law courts. It was circu-
lar for judges to say "a man is free if he can come into royal court and 
can come into court if he is free," but the judges had no other choice. 
Every other legal test of freedom - liability to various kinds of feudal 
dues or work obligations, biological descent, common repute -
proved inadequate to describe the range of tenurial and status relations 
in the thousands of English manors. 
Serf age was the paradigm of unfreedom, but full access to the com-
mon law was denied to other groups as well, including foreign 
merchants, forest dwellers, inhabitants of certain franchisal lordships, 
the conquered Irish, and the Jews. Each of these groups experienced 
the shared disability of alternative courts and law - the serf his ma-
norial lord, the Irishman his feudal lord and the local Irish chancery 
and parliament, the townsman his chartered borough court, the for-
eign merchant his chartered liberties, the monk his Ordinary and the 
church courts, the Jew his religious court (beth din) and the royal Ex-
practice for the villani. Hatcher, supra note 6, at 29-32; see also EDWARD MILLER & JOHN 
HATCHER, MEDIEVAL ENGLAND - RURAL SOCIETY AND EcONOMIC CHANGE 1086-1348, at 
126 (1978). 
96. The timing and causation of this shift is explored in HYAMS, supra note 59, at 221-65; 
Hilton, supra note 93, at 174. 
97. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 120; MILLER, supra note 5, at 152-53 (consolidation of free 
and unfree manorial tenantry into single peasant class). In the land-hungry years of the later 
thirteenth century, to be an unfree person holding land on favorable customary terms was often 
economically preferable to the poverty of the free, landless cottager. HOMANS, supra note 11, at 
244, 248; Hatcher, supra note 6, at 16-24. 
98. See supra notes 11, 26. For serfs purchasing freedom, see MILLER, supra note 5, at 142. 
But see POSTAN, Legal Status, supra note 11, at 283-84 (medieval court rolls and charters indi-
cate freedom less valuable than land); Hatcher, supra note 6, at 25 (few villeins purchase manu-
mission, indicating that free personal status was deemed of little value). 
99. MILLER & HATCHER, supra note 95, at 112-13, 118, 127; MILLER, supra note 5, at 129, 
142; Trrow, supra note 11, at 55-61. 
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chequer of the Jews. No one considered any of these persons a servus 
in the sense of a tied agricultural laborer, though contemporaries occa-
sionally employed the vocabulary of servitude. 100 
In this emerging common law framework, legal vulnerability and 
exclusion, rather than labor coercion as such, were the hallmarks of 
unfreedom, even for serfs. In time, certain rights of alien merchants 
were recognized in the Magna Carta and elsewhere, but such protec-
tion was of little practical import as their legal privileges fluctuated 
with royal need.101 As for the Jews, the repeated confiscatory taxes of 
the thirteenth century and their eventual expulsion from England in 
1290 illustrate the price of legal exclusion. Lacking the protection of 
custom, the excluded groups were among the few royal resources taxa-
ble without limit at a time when other, "free" groups succeeded in 
imposing limits on the reach of Angevin government. 102 Jurisdiction 
and legal protection served as the basis of the new definition of free-
dom, and outsiders were meaningfully unfree. 
One hundred years earlier, however, freedom meant not access to 
the common law - of which there was none yet - but having one's 
own law. 103 Almost everybody had the privilege of a special legal 
"deal." This was the essence of the early medieval and Carolingian 
notions of freedom and fairly describes English notions until the late 
twelfth century. The foreign merchants, townsmen, and Jews secured 
charters of protection guaranteeing the right to inherit at customary 
reliefs, assess and collect their own taxes, be exempt from judicial visi-
tations, have their fellows on juries when they were sued, select their 
own leaders, and be governed generally by their own customary rules. 
Being outsiders to a nascent royal legal system meant little hardship. 
If an outsider needed to opt into royal law, he might do that too - the 
earliest Pipe Rolls document suitors buying the discretionary boon of 
royal justice.104 
100. See Jonathan A. Bush, The Invisible Man: The Jew in Medieval English Law (1992) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Robert C. Stacey, 13th Century Anglo-Jewry and 
the Problem of the Expulsion 5-6 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). But see 
Gavin I. Langmuir, "Tanquam Servi": The Change in Jewish Status in French Law About 1200, 
in LES JUIFS DANS L'HISTOIRE DE FRANCE 25 (Myriam Yardeni ed., 1980), reprinted in TO-
WARD A DEFINITION OF ANTISEMITISM 167 (1990). 
101. MAGNA CARTA, 41 (1215), reprinted in SELECT CHARTERS 297-98 (H.W.C. Davis ed., 
Oxford: The Clarendon Press 9th ed. 1913) (William Stubbs ed., 1870), and in 1 SOURCES IN 
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY § 41, at 115, 121 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick G. 
Marcham eds. & trans., 1937); TERRENCE H. LLOYD, ALIEN MERCHANTS IN ENGLAND IN THE 
HIGH MIDDLE AGES 9-34 (1982); 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 458-67. 
102. J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA AND MEDIEVAL GOVERNMENT 156, 171 (1985). Recall, 
however, Aquinas' view that kings should not tax the nonusurious assets of their Jews beyond 
customary levels. Thomas Aquinas, De Regimine Judaeorum, in AQUINAS: SELECTED POLIT· 
ICAL WRITINGS 84 (A.P. D'Entreves ed. & John G. Dawson trans., 1970). 
103. For this discussion, I am indebted to Stacey, supra note 100, at 8-11; see also Hilton, 
supra note 93, at 176. 
104. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO 
GLANVILL 228 n.7, 254-55 (1959); Pipe Roll of Henry l in 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITU· 
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By the mid-thirteenth century, however, to be kept outside the ex-
panding common law - still to be unfree - was to be isolated and 
vulnerable rather than privileged. Milsom has written of "a transfor-
mation of elementary legal ideas"105 with respect to property in the 
late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and the same processes created 
new notions of law, royal power, and freedom in England, and per-
haps elsewhere.106 "Like serfs, Jews were one of the groups in the 
kingdom which failed to make the transition in the late 12th century 
from a basically Carolingian legal world of liberties to an essentially 
modern legal world which regarded liberty as a matter of civil rights 
guaranteed by a common law."101 
In short, the medieval concept of freedom was Steinfeldian. No-
tions of freedom changed, and different authorities had distinct under-
standings of freedom. Persons could be free in one setting and unfree 
in another. Persons disputed the status ascribed to them and adhered 
to earlier normative understandings of their legal disabilities. Free-
dom sometimes meant "free from" or "so free that";108 at other times 
it embodied a more absolute notion; in other contexts it had political 
overtones, as with Jews and alien merchants. 
Moreover, the common law's own doctrines of freedom and vil-
leinage embodied the complex fit between different social and legal un-
derstandings of freedom. As Maitland pointed out, English villeinage 
was no ordinary doctrine of serfdom.109 Instead of defining a class of 
partly free laborers bound in serfage - a straightforward legal task -
common law set out a slippery set of doctrines in which a serf was 
simultaneously wholly unfree (with respect to his lord) and wholly free 
(with respect to the world). Consequently, medieval freedom is com-
plex not only because it represented a moving line or unrealistically 
corresponded to social divisions, but also because, at least in its com-
mon law formulation, it was relative and contingent. Freedom was a 
line running through each serf, defining him as free or unfree depend-
ing on what he was doing and with whom. This is a startlingly mod-
ern conception, and likely it was too theoretical for judges to 
TIONAL HISTORY, supra note 101, at 49, 54 (extracts from 1130 Pipe Roll). See generally J.C. 
HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 49-61 (1st ed. 1965) (tradition of buying rights and exemptions). 
105. S.F.C. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 37 (1976). For 
another view of early thirteenth-century legal change, see Robert Palmer, The Origins of Property 
in England, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (1985). 
106. Paul Freedman, Catalan Lawyers and the Origins of Serfdom, 48 MEDIEVAL STUD. 288, 
289, 293, 297, 300, 302-04 (1986); PAUL FREEDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF PEASANT SERVITUDE IN 
MEDIEVAL CATALONIA (1991) (expanding upon Catalan Lawyers and the Origins of Serfdom, 
supra, and drawing similar conclusions for Spain). 
107. Stacey, supra note 100, at 11. 
108. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 5, at 129; Hilton, supra note 93, at 182. 
109. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 415-21, 429-30; see also DAVIS, supra note 
21, at 39 (qualifying Maitland's "relational freedom" model); HYAMS, supra note 59, at 125-60 
(same). 
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implement fully. But its mere formulation suggests how far medieval 
freedom was from an inherited legal status, clear to all observers and 
changeable only by flight or manumission. 
Steinfeld's model of contingent labor freedom holds important les-
sons for reconstructing the changing, disputed notions of medieval 
freedom. Narrowly, Steinfeld focuses on how early modem labor was 
coerced and yet still understood as free, and how this changed in the 
nineteenth century. But in broader terms, Steinfeld constructs a 
model of freedom that rejects straight-line Whiggish evolutionism, de-
nies the iron force of economic determinism on legal categorization, 
and uses legal material to escape the common law's stated categories 
of free and unfree. Steinfeld uses the insights of CLS to present a 
nuanced model of early modem labor freedom. He succeeds in devel-
oping the disputed and multiplicitous meanings of legal freedom. His 
argument and methodology will be instructive for those who seek to 
extend his efforts to a period before his mid-fourteenth-century start-
ing point. 
Those who tum to Steinfeld's work for its English common law 
teachings should be warned of one final point, however. Like much 
CLS scholarship, Steinfeld's book is infused with a heavy dose of 
American essentialism. His focus simply switches to America when 
the narrative reaches 1700. The best parts of Steinfeld's story unfold 
on this side of the Atlantic. Both the actual removal of specific per-
formance and criminal sanctions from hired labor in the eighteenth 
century (pp. 112-13) and the invention of the idea of modem free labor 
in the nineteenth century (pp. 159-60) take place in America. Stein-
feld follows the recent practice of stressing the rediscovered American 
Revolution, which languished for so long in progressive historiogra-
phy as a distant afterthought to the French, Russian, and even the so-
called English Revolutions. Steinfeld's craftsmen and yeomen struggle 
for and achieve the final repudiation of the ancient institutions of labor 
servitude, partly because they are awakened by the Revolutionary ex-
perience and its ideology (pp. 123-27, 167). Of course, Steinfeld is far 
too careful a historian to argue that England remained a nation of 
deferential laborers with attitudes typified by the laborers in Ronald 
Blythe's evocative Aken.field. 110 But he clearly concludes that practi-
cal and ideological changes unfolded first in America. 
There are good reasons for focusing on American developments, 
but Steinfeld's analysis of the emancipation of labor may be persuasive 
enough to apply to English labor as well. He cites the work of Doug-
las Hay in support of the proposition that labor coercion stayed on the 
books in English law until as late as the 1870s (pp. 115-16, 243 n.36, 
244 n.46, 248 n.82). Clearly it did. 111 In fact, much of the old regula-
llO. RONALD BLYTHE, AKENFIELD: PORTRAIT OF AN ENGLISH VILLAGE 110-15 (1969). 
111. David Philips, The Black County Magistracy, 1835-60, 3 MIDLAND HIST. 161, 180-81 
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tory labor framework remained, strengthened by the newer Combina-
tion Acts (1799 and 1801). But even in the early nineteenth century, 
when the Combination Acts were in effect, laborers could seek higher 
wages by way of a wage reassessment under the Statute of Artificers; 
strangely, one of the decaying Tudor act's chief uses was to shield this 
form of collective labor activity. 112 As the nineteenth century wore 
on, important parts of the Combination Acts were repealed, as were 
other oppressive labor rules. 113 Even during the early nineteenth-cen-
tury heyday of coercive labor, the statutes were imperfect vehicles for 
labor coercion, and English judges occasionally determined that the 
common law of riot and conspiracy also failed to provide the tools to 
crack down on a particular labor activity; 114 another instance of law 
constraining those who made it. 115 In short, English labor law may 
have been "contested" in much the same way as American law. 
Nor was the configuration of English labor law chiefly the result of 
legal weakness or political benevolence, as some have argued. 116 We 
have a rich scholarship on English class formation and labor resistance 
- including hundreds of strikes - in the eighteenth century.117 As 
long ago as the Webbs, scholars traced the fledgling but continuous 
workingmen's institutions that were the seedbed of the union move-
ment.118 These scholars found that working people were not only the 
passive victims of industrialization, but that they formed institutions 
that actively articulated their aspirations. As for the criminal sane-
(1976); Daphne Simon, Masters and Servants, in DEMOCRACY AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 
160 (John Saville ed., 1954); D.C. Woods, The Operation of the Master and Servants Act in the 
Black Country, 1858-1875, 7 MIDLAND HIST. 93 (1982); see also Ralph Shlomowitz, On Punish-
ments and Rewards in Coercive Labor Systems: Comparative Perspectives, 12 SLAVERY & ABOLI-
TION 97, 100 (1991) (criminal sanctions in Australia as well). 
112. RULE, supra note 30, at 116-18. 
These famous enactments [the general Combination laws] by forbidding trade unionism for 
straightforward wage demands, made a legal issue such as the enforcement of 5 Elizabeth 
[the Statute of Artificers] especially valuable. To organise journeymen for the purpose of 
petitioning Parliament, or for the purpose of funding prosecutions under the law [i.e., prose-
cutions of employers for violating 5 Elizabeth] could not be regarded as illegal .... 
Id. at 116; see COLE & POSTGATEsupra note 41, at 175-76; DOROTHY MARSHALL, INDUSTRIAL 
ENGLAND 1776-1851, at 145 (1973). 
113. For a useful chronology, see John V. Orth, The Law of Strikes, 1847-1871, in LAW AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE IN BRITISH HISTORY 126 (J.A. Guy & H.G. Beale eds., 1984), and John v. 
Orth, The Legal Status of English Trade Unions, 1799-1871, in LAW-MAKING AND LAW-MAK-
ERS IN BRITISH HISTORY 195 (Alan Harding ed., 1980) [hereinafter Orth, The Legal Status]. 
114. THOMPSON, supra note 36, at 507, 526 (Statute of Artificers as basis for criminal prose-
cutions); Orth, The Legal Status, supra note 113, at 197-99. 
115. See supra note 64. 
116. See, e.g., LINDER, supra note 33, at 103-04 (prolabor provisions in English law result 
from concessions by the ruling class, while the driving force behind prolabor provisions in Amer-
ican law was the working class itself). 
117. RULE, supra note 30, chs. 4, 6, 7; STEVENSON, supra note 38, at 113-35; THOMPSON, 
supra note 36. 
118. RULE, supra note 30, at 149-51 (citing Webbs' limited definition of unionism and eight-
eenth-century examples). 
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tions, those whom the law punished for leaving work were frequently 
not errant individuals, but individuals and groups participating in 
strikes, particularly in the mines and the iron industry. 119 In other 
words, the English criminal sanctions are best seen as a peripheral fea-
ture in the larger context of a collective class struggle. That the crimi-
nal sanctions lasted longer in England is less important than the fact 
that, in both countries, organizing and collective work stoppages were 
illegal and remained so, and that working people challenged this ille-
gality against the odds. They did so by using the rhetoric of rights and 
revolution, even if English activists did not use the rhetoric of popular 
republicanism that historians have identified in the American 
discourse. 
The parallel evolution of English and American labor law also ex-
isted in areas outside of the direct regulation of wage labor. Thus, the 
abolition movement against slavery began its uneven rise in the late 
eighteenth century in both England and America. Among whites, it 
began as a cause of the middle classes, but abolition also gained mod-
est acceptance among working people in both countries.120 Both 
countries abolished the slave trade and then slavery, in stages. Finally, 
after black emancipation in both the British Empire and America, em-
ployers attempted to employ Asian contract labor; in other words, as 
Steinfeld concludes in the American context (pp. 177-84), it was still 
not inevitable that coerced labor was deemed to be slavery or that the 
abolition of the latter meant the end of the various forms of peon-
age.121 Overall, both English and American law repudiated slave la-
bor over the course of the nineteenth century, and in both countries 
working people, and eventually the law as well, came to view all forms 
of coerced labor as uncomfortably akin to slavery. The picture that 
emerges is one of parallelism, not American innovation, giving Stein-
feld's model of labor emancipation even broader application than he 
attempts. 
In fact, the question might better be framed not in terms of 
whether legal change occurred first in America, but why CLS legal 
history focuses on change here. The explanation lies at the heart of 
119. A.H. MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND & WALES 1750-1950, 
at 328 (1980); Simon, supra note 111, at 171-72, 190, 194-95; Woods, supra note 111, at 93, 98, 
111. 
120. PHILIP s. FONER, BRmSH LABOR AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1981); Eric 
Foner, Abolitionism and the Labor Movement in Antebellum America, in ANTI-SLAVERY, RELI-
GION AND REFORM 254 (Christine Bolt & Seymour Drescher eds., 1980). But see Patricia Hollis, 
Anti-Slavery and British Working-Class Radicalism in the Years of Reform, in ANTI-SLAVERY, 
RELIGION AND REFORM, supra, at 294 (intense English working-class distrust of middle-class 
abolitionists). 
121. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 11-13, 18-20 (1944) (reviewing repeated efforts of state 
legislatures to devise constitutionally acceptable servitude); Taylor v. United States, 244 F. 321 
(4th Cir. 1917) (forcible return to contractual terms of service is not within antipeonage statute); 
Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 681-82, 685-90 (D. Ala. 1903) (allowing certain terms of compelled 
labor). 
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CLS. A major strand of CLS scholarship is devoted to unpacking, 
even deconstructing, mainstream legal doctrine. Special emphasis has 
always been devoted to legal history in general, and to late nineteenth-
century formalism in particular, to explain legal change under Ameri-
can industrial capitalism.122 If this can be done at the expense of 
"straight" scholarship, so much the better - hence the CLS tradition 
of "trashing."123 The result has been entertaining and important ana-
lytic work but also a perceived reluctance to articulate a positive pro-
gram, a failure for which even sympathetic observers have criticized 
the movement.124 
Like earlier radicals, however, at least some in the CLS movement 
have found a provisional agenda in modern, radicalized readings of 
foundational American legal texts, notably the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. This is why so many scholars want to appropriate Thomas 
Jefferson and his legacy.12s 
Perhaps the obscure case of Robertson v. Baldwin 126 holds the clue 
to Steinfeld's focus on the American invention of free labor. The 
Supreme Court held that runaway sailors could be seized and com-
pelled to finish their terms of service, notwithstanding the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Steinfeld cites the case to illustrate the persistence of 
traditionalist notions of coerced labor (p. 251 n.36). But Justice 
Harlan's Jeffersonian dissent speaks more directly to Steinfeld's pro-
ject: Who cares about inherited common law structures? We are 
Americans, new men, created and, in the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, recreated as a nation under the sheltering wing of new 
emancipatory ideas. We can do better. It is this fundamental Ameri-
can vision that continues to animate the work of Steinfeld and others. 
122. Guyora Binder, What's Left?, 69 TEXAS L. REv. 1985, 2002-07 (1991) (explaining the 
focus on late nineteenth-century formalism); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984) (discussing CLS interest in doctrinal legal history). 
123. Mark G. Kelman, Trashing. 36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1984) (explaining the trashing 
technique). 
124. Eugene D. Genovese, Critical Legal Studies as Radical Politics and World View, 3 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 131, 134-48 (1991) (reviewing MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL 
STUDIES (1987)) (leftist critique of CLS); Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radi-
cal?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 281-89 (1984) (liberal critique of CLS). 
125. "It is a curious phenomenon of American scholarship that everyone wants Jefferson on 
their side." Joyce Appleby, Historians, Community, and the Pursuit of Jefferson: Comment on 
Professor Tom/ins, 4 STUD. AMER. PoL. DEV. 35, 41 (1990), cited in Ernst, supra note 90, at 
1062 n.284. Outside oflegal scholarship and CLS, see, for example, the essays collected in JEF-
FERSONIAN LEGACIES (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993), especially Paul Finkelman's passionate Jefferson 
and Slaves: "Treason Against the Hopes of the World," in, id. at 181. 
126. 165 U.S. 275, 293-97, 302 (1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
